Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2018

The Supreme Court, Judicial Elections, and Dark Money
Richard Briffault
Columbia Law School, brfflt@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Briffault, The Supreme Court, Judicial Elections, and Dark Money, DEPAUL LAW REVIEW, VOL. 67, P.
281, 2018; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 14-579 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2089

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

The Supreme Court, Judicial Elections, and Dark Money
Richard Briffault1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judges, even when popularly elected, are not representatives; they are not agents for their
voters, nor should they take voter preferences into account in adjudicating cases. However,
popularly elected judges are representatives for some election law purposes.

Unlike other

elected officials, judges are not politicians. But judges are policy-makers. Judicial elections are
subject to the same constitutional doctrines that govern voting on legislators, executives, and
ballot propositions. Except when they are not. The same First Amendment doctrine that protects
campaign speech in legislative, executive, and ballot proposition elections applies to campaign
speech in judicial elections—but not in quite the same way. Independent committees have the
same right to spend in judicial elections as they do in other elections.

But significant

independent spending can result in the imposition of a constitutional restriction on the behavior
of an elected judge who benefited from that spending. This restriction is without parallel for
elected legislators or executives who benefit from similar independent spending.
Every statement in the preceding paragraph reflects a decision of the Supreme Court
concerning judicial elections. As the point-counterpoint indicates, the Court’s jurisprudence of
judicial elections is a bit of a mess. Technically, all the decisions can be made to hang together,
but their emphases, implications, and rhetoric often differ substantially. They can be summed up
in the statement: Judicial elections are very similar to, but not quite the same as, other elections.
Unfortunately, many significant issues fall into the “not quite the same” space. For now, at least,
judicial campaign behavior and judicial campaign finance practices are for the most part

1 Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
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governed by the same First Amendment doctrine that applies to campaign speech and campaign
money generally, but that doctrine may not be applied to judicial elections in precisely the same
way and some—s restrictions that would be unconstitutional in most elections may be
constitutional in judicial elections. Given the series of close divides that have marked the
Supreme Court’s judicial election jurisprudence to date, predicting the future is uncertain.
This has implications for any effort to address the problem of “dark money” in judicial
elections. The term “[d]ark money is a short-hand reference to spending by independent groups
that is funded by undisclosed sources. Most likely, dark money in judicial elections can be
regulated to the extent, but only to the extent that it can be regulated in other elections. That is, it
almost surely can be subject to more extensive disclosure requirements, but it also almost surely
cannot be limited. The one area in which the judicial election context of dark money may matter
is the possibility that a judge who benefited from dark money spending mat be required to recuse
under certain circumstances. But recusal is unlikely to be an effective response to the concerns
raised by dark money.
This Article reviews the Supreme Court’s evolving treatment of judicial elections and the
resulting implications for the regulation of dark money in judicial races. Part II provides a brief
summary of the Court’s cases addressing state laws dealing with judicial elections. This sets up
the underlying tension within the Court over whether elected judges are policymakers or
“representatives” of the voters, like other elected officials. Part III undertakes a more extended
treatment of the three cases decided between 2002 and 2015 that directly address judicial
election campaigning and its consequences—Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,2 Caperton

2 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2
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v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,3 and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar.4 This judicial campaign trilogy
seeks to hold together the First Amendment’s commitment to robust and unrestricted campaign
speech with a growing concern for the implications of judicial campaign spending for the due
process value of impartial judicial decision-making and for. the public’s confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. Part IV examines the meaning of dark money, how it may be regulated
in non-judicial elections, and whether and to what extent it can be more, or differently, regulated
in judicial elections. Part V. concludes.
II. THE JUDICIAL ELECTION PROCESS AND THE “REPRESENTATIVE” QUESTION
The Supreme Court’s treatment of judicial elections began with the assumption that
judicial elections are different from other elections because the role of the judge, and the
relationship of the judge to the electorate, differs from that of other elected officials. In 1972 in
Wells v. Edwards5 the Court summarily affirmed the decision of a three-judge panel holding that
judicial elections are not subject to the one person, one vote requirement that governs elections to
executive and legislative offices. In the words of the lower court, “manifestly, judges . . . are not
representatives in the same sense as are legislators or the executive.

Their function is to

administer the law, not to spouse [sic] the cause of a particular constituency.”6 Thus, the
“rationale” for the equal population principle “which evolved out of efforts to preserve a truly
representative form of government, is simply not relevant to the makeup of the judiciary.”7

3 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
4 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
5 409 U.S. 1095 (1973), aff’g, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972).
6 Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 455, quoting and citing Stokes v. Fortsen 234 F.Supp. 575, 577 (N.D.
Ga. 1964).
7 Id. at 455.
3
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Two decades later, however, the Court shifted course and determined that elected judges
are “representatives” for purposes of voting rights, albeit in a case of statutory interpretation, not
constitutional doctrine. Chisom v. Roemer8 addressed whether the anti-vote dilution provision of
the Voting Rights Act, which proscribes voting standards, practices, or procedures that make it
more difficult for protected racial and language minority groups “to elect representatives of their
choice,” applies to judicial elections. The defendants argued, relying in part on Wells, that since
judges are not “representatives” the provision of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to judicial
elections.

The majority disagreed.

Although the Court’s analysis turned primarily on

Congressional intent, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, determined that
when judges are chosen by popular election they are, indeed, to some extent “representatives” of
the voting public.

Justice Stevens acknowledged that “ideally public opinion should be

irrelevant to the judge’s role.”9 But he concluded:
The fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the
real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges with total
indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for
elected office. When each of several members of a court must be a resident of a
separate district and must be elected by voters of that district, it seems both
reasonable and realistic to characterize the winners as representatives of that
district.”10

Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy sharply dissented. Judges
may be elected by the people, Justice Scalia wrote, but they do not represent the people “in the

8 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
9 Id. at 400.
10 Id. at 400–01.
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ordinary sense. . . . [T]he judge represents the Law – which often requires him to rule against the
People.”11
The back-and-forth between Wells and Chisom nicely illustrates the tension in the Court
over whether elected judges are representatives in terms of their relationship to the electorate in
the way that other elected officials are.12 Two other cases that may provide additional insight on
the issue are Gregory v. Ashcroft13 and New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres.14
Gregory was not an elections case; rather, it addressed whether the Missouri Constitution’s
requirement that judges retire at the age of seventy violates the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act’s ban on mandatory retirement. The Act exempted from the ban, inter alia,
state appointees “on the policymaking level.” Noting that judges “exercise . . . discretion
concerning issues of public importance,” the Court concluded that Missouri’s appointed judges

11 Id. at 410–11.
12 See also Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991) (reviewing application of section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act to judicial elections); Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney General, 501 U.S.
419 (1991) (upholding application of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to the election of trial
judges). For a recent assessment of the law governing judicial election districting in the
aftermath of Williams-Yulee, see Alec Webley, Judges Are (Not?) Politicians: Williams-Yulee v.
The Florida Bar and the Constitutional Law of Redistricting of Judicial Election Districts, 19
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 851 (2016).
13 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
14 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
5

“fall presumptively under the policymaking-level exemption.”15

To be sure, the Court’s

federalism concern placed a thumb on the scale by presuming that a state constitution should set
the rules for state judicial selection unless clearly displaced by federal law, so that any ambiguity
in the federal law was construed in favor of the state. But the decision still required some
recognition of the policymaking role of judges. Indeed, Chisom, decided the same day as
Gregory, drew on Gregory’s “recogni[tion] that judges do engage in policymaking at some
level” in finding judges to be representatives.16
Lopez Torres involved a First Amendment challenge to New York’s complex system of
political party selection of judicial nominees through a party convention that the plaintiffs
contended favored party bosses and burdened insurgents. The case focused on the associational
rights of political parties and the conflicting First Amendment rights of parties and their
members, relying entirely on precedents concerning the party role in elections for executive or
legislative office. That the dispute involved a judicial election seemed to be of almost no
moment to the Court, except for a passing observation that the state legislature, which enacted
the judicial convention system, might prefer conventions to primaries for the nomination of
judicial candidates because a primary “leaves judicial selection to voters uninformed about
15 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 466–67. The Act also exempted elected officials from the ban.
Missouri judges are initially appointed to office and then subject to retention election. In
defending the state constitutionality of its mandatory retirement requirement, Missouri also
contended that these judges fell within the elected official exemption. Because it found that they
fell within the “appointee on the policymaking level” exemption, the Court did not have to
address whether they were elected within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 467.
16 501 U.S. at 399 n.27.
6

judicial qualifications, and places a high premium upon the ability to raise money.” 17 Lopez
Torres did not directly address the “representative” question, but it does have implications for
whether judicial elections can be treated as different from other elections. The overall thrust of
the opinion was that the judicial nature of the election was irrelevant, but, as the quoted language
suggests, there was a slight hint of support for a more restrictive electoral process when the
election of judges is at stake.
III. THE JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN TRILOGY
A. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
The Supreme Court launched its examination of the state regulation of judicial election
campaigns in 2002 in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, which considered and invalidated
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct’s announce clause.18 The clause provided that a judicial
candidate should not “announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”19
Promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1974, the announce clause was based on a
canon of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the American Bar Association in
1972.20
The announce clause can be seen as aimed at preventing circumvention of another
restriction on judicial campaign statements—the directive that judicial candidates not make
“pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the

17 552 U.S. at 206.
18 536 U.S. 765.
19 Id. at 770.
20 Id. at 768.
7

duties of the office.”21 As Justice Ginsburg contended in her White dissent, “the ban on pledges
or promises is easily circumvented” by “statements that do not technically constitute pledges or
promises but nevertheless ‘publicly mak[e] known how [the candidate] would decide’ legal
issues.”22 Nonetheless, the breadth of the announce clause opened it up to First Amendment
attack. When the ABA revised its Model Code in 1990, it dropped the announce clause. The
ABA’s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility stated its belief that the clause was
“an overly broad restriction on speech,”23 and a series of state and lower federal court decisions
in the 1990s narrowed or invalidated similar clauses. By the time of the White decision, as a
result of litigation and canon revisions only nine states continued to impose a version of the
announce clause and several of these were narrower than the Minnesota version challenged in
White.24
As a result, the Court’s invalidation of the announce clause was not in itself that
significant.25 But the way the Court did so, in an opinion for the five-justice majority written by

21 Id. at 770.
22 Id. at 819–20 (citations omitted).
23 American Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and
Judicial Code Subcomm., Draft Revisions to the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct 56
(1989).
24 See Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 181, 203 (2004).
25 Although in the intermediate aftermath of the decision, other states with announce clauses
eliminated them. See id. at 208–09.
8

Justice Scalia, was quite striking.26 Most importantly, the Court framed the case as a classic First
Amendment problem. Treating the announce clause as a content-based restriction that burdened
speech “‘at the core of our First Amendment freedoms’—speech about the qualifications of
candidates for public office,” the Court subjected the clause to the most stringent standard of
First Amendment review, strict scrutiny.27 Under strict scrutiny the defenders of the clause had
to prove that it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.28
The Court then closely parsed the two interests presented by the state to justify the
Clause—preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the appearance of the
impartiality of the state judiciary. Noting that the state was “rather vague” about what it meant
by impartiality, Justice Scalia found that “impartiality” could be used in any of three possible
senses: (i) the avoidance of bias with respect to a specific party in a judicial proceeding; (ii) “the
lack of preconception in favor or against a particular legal view;” or (iii) open-mindedness, in the
sense of being willing to consider views that oppose the judge’s preconceptions and being open
to persuasion.29 Justice Scalia determined that assuring the first meaning of impartiality is a
compelling state interest and serves the interest in affording litigants due process, but that the
announce clause was not narrowly tailored—or tailored at all—to achieve that interest as it did
not restrict speech concerning parties, but only speech concerning issues.
26 Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy and Thomas. Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy also wrote separate concurring
opinions.
27 White, 536 U.S. at 774.
28 Id. at 774–75 (citing election law cases involving executive or legislative candidates).
29 Id. at 775–81.
9

Justice Scalia summarily rejected the second definition of impartiality as a compelling
state interest or as barely a state interest at all. In his view, virtually all judges come to the bench
after legal careers in which they must have developed some preconceptions about legal issues.
Accordingly, preventing this kind of partiality would be impossible;

indeed, it would be

undesirable as it would produce judicial candidates who had never thought deeply about the legal
issues they would have to deal with on the bench.30
The Court then turned to the third definition of impartiality—open-mindedness. Justice
Scalia acknowledged that “[i]t may well be that impartiality in this sense, and the appearance of
it, are desirable in the judiciary.”31 But he concluded that the announce clause flunked the
underinclusiveness component of strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring prong.

In classic First

Amendment analysis, a statute or regulation may fail narrow tailoring because it is either overly
broad or underinclusive.32

Overbreadth is fatal because it burdens far more speech than

necessary to achieve the compelling interest. The flaw with underinclusiveness is more subtle.
An underinclusive law may be struck down because it is so incapable of achieving its stated goal
that there is no point in sustaining the burden it does impose.33 The limited ability of an
underinclusive measure to achieve the asserted interest may suggest that the stated purpose was
not that interest at all, but something else less compelling. 34 Limitations placed on the announce
clause by the Minnesota Supreme Court blunted plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge but may have
rendered it more vulnerable to an underinclusiveness attack.

30 Id. at 777–78.
31 Id. at 778.
32

See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992).
See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 865-66 (2015).
34
See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520, 534-40 (1993);
R.A.V. v. Coty of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-396 (1992).
33
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The announce clause restricted only statements made by judicial candidates while
campaigning. However, according to Justice Scalia, “statements in election campaigns are such
an infinitesimal portion of the public commitments to legal positions that judges (or judges-tobe) undertake . . . .”35 As he noted, judges and judicial candidates often express their views on
disputed legal questions “outside the context of adjudication” and, for sitting judges, in opinions
written while on the bench. If the announcement of views undermines the fact or appearance of
impartiality as open-mindedness, limiting only campaign statements “is so woefully
underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”36
In dissent, Justice Stevens37 contended that campaign statements are indeed different,
justifying special restriction. He explained that unlike other assertions of views, campaign
statements are intended to convey to the voters a commitment to acting consistently with those
views, and are likely to be so taken by the voters.38 Justice Scalia responded simply that it “is
not self-evidently true” that judges will feel “significantly greater compulsion, or appear to feel
significantly greater compulsion, to maintain consistency” with campaign statements than other
statements.39 Justice Stevens may have had the better of the argument as declarations of views
made publicly on the campaign trail for the purpose of persuading voters may well be seen and
treated as more binding than assertions in a law review article or even in a judicial opinion, but
35 Id. at 779.
36 Id. at 780.
37 Justice Stevens’ dissent was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Ginsburg
authored her own dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.
38 Id. at 801–02.
39 Id. at 780–81.
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that only underscores the majority’s stringent application of the underinclusiveness component
of the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test.
Three other points about the White majority opinion are worth noting. First, the Court
emphasized the significance of the announce clause’s burden on electoral speech and, in so
doing, assimilated judicial election campaigns to other election campaigns for First Amendment
purposes. Quoting earlier First Amendment elections cases, the Court stressed that “‘[D]ebate
on the qualifications of candidates’ is ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First
Amendment freedoms.’”40 The fact that only judicial elections were affected by the announce
clause was of no moment.
Second, the flipside to the Court’s commitment to treating judicial elections as akin to
other elections was its dismissal of the argument that the due process interest of litigants requires
different rules for judicial elections. Due process, and the judicial impartiality it requires, was
the animating concern of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.41 As she explained, as a matter of due
process, judges owe the litigants before them a duty of impartiality and owe the public an
appearance of impartiality. Justice Ginsburg asserted this would be compromised by campaign
statements that commit judges to positions on issues likely to come before them, with the danger
of electoral retaliation if they do not abide by those commitments. Justice Scalia, however,
pooh-poohed the likelihood that campaign statements would constrain judicial decision-making.
In his view, if the possibility that an elected judge’s attention to the impact of a decision on his or
her prospects for reelection violates due process, then “the practice of electing judges is itself a

40 Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
41 Id. at 813–21.
12

violation of due process”—a conclusion which Justice Scalia rejected out of hand.42 More
strikingly, Justice Scalia challenged the very idea articulated by Justice Ginsburg in the opening
words of her dissent that “judges perform a function fundamentally different from that of the
people’s elected representatives. Legislative and executive officials act on behalf of the voters
who placed them in office.”43 Justice Ginsburg then quoted Justice Scalia’s dissent in Chisom
that stated “judge[s] represen[t] the Law.”44 Despite what he said in Chisom, Justice Scalia in
White responded that “Justice Ginsburg greatly exaggerates the difference between judicial and
legislative elections. . . . This complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of
‘representative government’ might have some truth in those countries where judges neither make
law themselves nor set aside the laws enacted by the legislature. It is not a true picture of the
American system.”45
Third, although the overall thrust of the majority’s opinion was to treat judicial elections
just like other elections for First Amendment purposes—drawing Justice Ginsburg’s
condemnation of “this unilocular, ‘an election is an election’ approach,”46—in fact, White did not
go quite that far. Justice Scalia was careful to state “we neither assert nor imply that the First
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative
office.”47 In rejecting Justice Stevens’ position that statements made in an election campaign
42 Id. at 783.
43 Id. at 803.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 784.
46 Id. at 805.
47 Id. at 783.
13

pose a special threat to the fact or appearance of a candidate’s open-mindedness, Justice Scalia
was careful to distinguish the announce clause formulated from Minnesota’s separate canon that
merely barred judicial candidates from making campaign “pledges or promises” with respect to
their conduct in office. Justice Scalia noted that Stevens’ argument “might be plausible, perhaps,
with regard to campaign promises.”48
The Court was also careful to avoid expressing a view on the “pledges or promises”
clause, even though such a clause would surely be unconstitutional if enforced against candidates
for legislative or executive office.49 To be sure, the pledges or promises clause was not at issue
in White so there was no need for the Court to address it. But the Court’s opinion and its careful
sidestepping of that clause at least left open the possibility that some restrictions on judicial
campaign conduct might pass constitutional muster. This is true even if the overall tenor of the
opinion—and especially the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy50—treated the First
Amendment problem posed by the regulation of judicial elections as essentially the same as in
campaign regulation more generally.
48 Id. at 780 (emphasis in original).
49 See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55–58 (1982) (some candidate promises “are universally
acknowledged as legitimate”; “Candidate commitments enhance the accountability of
government officials to the people whom they represent, and assist the voters in predicting the
effect of their vote”; candidate for county commissioner has a constitutional right to make
promises that “express[] . . . his intention to exercise public power in a manner that he believed
might be acceptable to some class of citizens”).
50 536 U.S. at 795 (“the State cannot opt for an elected judiciary and then assert that its
democracy, in order to work as desired, compels the abridgment of speech”).
14

White was followed by a wave of constitutional attacks on many provisions of the state
canons regulating judicial campaign conduct, as well as by revisions to those canons by the state
judicial bodies that imposed them. One set of challenges and revisions focused on canons
prohibiting judicial candidates from “committing” or “appearing to commit” themselves “with
respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court.” -- arguably a
narrower version of the announce clause. Other canons subjected to review in the aftermath of
White included the pledges or promises clause; various measures restricting the partisan activities
of judicial candidates; bans on the personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates;
and prohibitions on statements by a candidate that knowingly “misrepresent the identity,
qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent.” As a
result, many restrictions on judicial campaigning were narrowed or eliminated. However, the
Court’s 2009 decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. became something of a speed bump
on the road to the complete assimilation of judicial campaign conduct to the campaigns for
executive and legislative offices and ballot propositions. Although Caperton did not address or
sustain a constraint on judicial campaign activity, its focus on the implications of judicial
campaigns for the behavior of judges in office after the election gave new impetus to the due
process implications of judicial elections which had been emphasized by Justice Ginsburg’s
White dissent but downplayed by the White majority.
B. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.
Caperton grew out of the hotly contested 2004 election for a seat on the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in which incumbent Justice Warren McGraw was challenged by
attorney Brent Benjamin. Don Blankenship, chairman, chief executive officer, and president of
A.T. Massey Co., contributed $1,000—the statutory maximum—to Benjamin’s campaign

15

committee.51 Blankenship also gave another $2.5 million to “And for the Sake of the Kids,” a
political committee organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code that made
independent expenditures in support of Benjamin and in opposition to McGraw.52 Blankenship
spent yet another $500,000 on his own independent expenditures—direct mail, television and
newspaper advertising—promoting Benjamin’s candidacy.53

Blankenship’s donations and

spending in support of Benjamin amounted to more than the total spent by all other Benjamin
supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s own campaign committee.54
The 2004 election, which Benjamin won with fifty-three percent of the vote,55 occurred
as a lawsuit against Massey Coal was making its way through the West Virginia courts. In 2002,
a West Virginia jury returned a verdict against Massey and awarded the Caperton plaintiffs $50
million in compensatory and punitive damages.56 The plaintiffs prevailed in 2004 and 2005
against post-trial motions brought by Massey, which ultimately filed an appeal with the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The Caperton plaintiffs moved to disqualify now-Justice
Benjamin under the Due Process Clause and the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct from
participating in the case, claiming that Blankenship’s campaign support for Benjamin created a
conflict of interest.57 Justice Benjamin denied the motion, declaring that no evidence had been
51 556 U.S. at 873.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 873–74.
16

presented that he could be anything but fair and impartial.58 Thereafter, the West Virginia
Supreme Court, by a 3-2 vote with Justice Benjamin in the majority, reversed the $50 million
verdict against Massey.59 The plaintiffs sought a rehearing, and moved to have Justice Benjamin
recuse himself from participating in the decision to rehear. Justice Benjamin again declined to
recuse.60 The court granted the rehearing request, and the Caperton plaintiffs again moved to
have Benjamin recuse himself from participating in the rehearing. For the third time, Justice
Benjamin declined to recuse and the court again voted 3-2, with Justice Benjamin in the
majority, to reverse the jury verdict. The plaintiffs then sought review by the United States
Supreme Court, contending that given the “extraordinary amount” of campaign finance support
he had received from Massey’s board chairman and principal officer,61 Justice Benjamin’s
repeated participation in the Massey case denied them an impartial decision-maker in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, agreed
with the plaintiffs. According to Justice Kennedy, the combination of several factors gave rise to
a “probability of actual bias” such that Benjamin violated Caperton’s due process rights by

58 Id. at 874.
59 Id. at 875.
60 Id. Both sides filed disqualification motions aimed at three of the five justices who had
participated in deciding the appeal. Two justices – one who had voted for Caperton’s position
and one who had voted for Massey’s position – recused themselves from the rehearing, but
Justice Benjamin did not. He selected the replacements for the recused justices. Id. at 874–75.
61 Id. at 872.
17

refusing to recuse himself from the case.62 Justice Kennedy noted the “extraordinary” financial
support in absolute dollars, as a share of the spending in support of Benjamin, and as a fraction
of the total spending in the election.

He determined that Blankenship’s spending had a

“significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome,” and he pointed to the “the
temporal relationship between the election and the pending case.”63 Like the circumstances of
the case itself, the decision was “extraordinary” in several respects.
First, the Court had never before determined that campaign support for a judicial
candidate could trigger a finding that an elected judge was unconstitutionally biased in favor of
the supporter. As the Court acknowledged, the Due Process Clause had previously been held to
require judicial recusal only in cases where the judge had a financial interest in the outcome of
the case or, more rarely, the judge had a conflict arising from her participation in an earlier phase
of the case.64 Indeed, the Court had previously determined that claims of improper partiality
requiring recusal resulting from “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness
of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion” 65 and not of
constitutional moment. Unconstitutional bias in favor of a financial campaign supporter was
something new.
Second, the Court emphasized “[t]his problem arises in the context of judicial elections, a
framework not presented in the precedents we have reviewed and discussed.” 66 Whereas White
62 Id. at 885–87.
63 Id. at 885–87.
64 Id. at 876–81.
65 Id. at 876 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
66 Id. at 881–82.
18

minimized the fact that the election affected by the announce clause was judicial, Caperton made
that fact central. In elections for other offices, the Court has dismissed the idea that independent
spending could give the spender some kind of corrupting or otherwise undue influence over the
officeholder benefited by the spending. Dissenting in McConnell v. FEC,67 Justice Kennedy
declared that the possibility of officeholder “favoritism” to financial backers was not corruption,
would not give rise to the appearance of corruption, and so was not a constitutional basis for
limiting campaign money.68 He reiterated this point in his majority opinion for the Court in
Citizens United v. FEC,69 which was decided the year after Caperton. Current Supreme Court
campaign finance doctrine rejects the idea that there is anything improper about an elected
official favoring the interests of her campaign’s financial supporters unless there is an outright
quid pro quo between the financial supporter and the official.70 But central to Justice Kennedy’s
analysis in Caperton was his certainty that “Justice Benjamin would . . . feel a debt of gratitude
to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected.”71 The Court held this “debt”
created “a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions”72 that
67 540 U.S. 98 (2003).
68 Id. at 297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
70 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (“Constituents have the right to
support candidates who share their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow
constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns.
Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials.”)
71 558 U.S. at 882.
72 Id. at 884.
19

Justice Benjamin would be favorably disposed to Blankenship’s interest in the case.

The

“serious risk of actual bias” meant that it was unconstitutional for Justice Benjamin to participate
in the Massey Coal case.73
Justice Kennedy reiterated the crucial significance that Caperton involved a judicial
election the following year in his opinion for the Court in Citizens United, asserting that
Caperton was no precedent for limiting corporate independent spending concerning a
presidential candidate because Caperton involved a judge and not another category of elected
official.74 As he stressed in Citizens United, Caperton “was based on a litigant's due process
right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge”75 and so did not provide any support for restricting
a litigant’s campaign speech.76 In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy repeated his view that
“[f]avoritism and influence are . . . [un]avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of
an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters
and contributors who support those policies. . . . Democracy is premised on responsiveness.”77

73 Emphasizing just how novel the finding of an unconstitutional conflict of interest was,
Blankenship himself was not a party to the case, and Massey Coal – the actual party – had not
itself given or spent any funds to aid Benjamin. The majority treated Blankenship’s and
Massey’s interests as equivalent. As Blankenship was Massey’s board chairman and principal
officer, id. at 873, that makes some sense, but legally they were distinct.
74 558 U.S. at 360.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 358 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
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Judges may be elected, but that does not make them “representatives,” at least not to the extent
of allowing them to favor litigants who had been major campaign finance supporters.
Third, Caperton is not a First Amendment case.

The opinion for the Court never

mentions the First Amendment. Nor was Caperton technically a campaign finance case, that is,
a case dealing with restrictions or requirements with respect to the use of campaign money. The
issue of whether Blankenship’s spending should have been or could be restricted never arose.
Indeed, the Court ignored a foundational feature of campaign finance law.

Ordinarily, in

campaign finance parlance the term “contribution” refers to money given to a candidate or to an
intermediary—such as a political party or political action committee—to be given to a
candidate.78 Money spent by a candidate, party, or independent group on direct efforts to
communicate with, persuade, or mobilize voters is called an “expenditure.”79 Contributions can
be limited because they raise the possibility of corruption or the appearance of corruption.80
Expenditures may not be limited because, the Court has long contended, they pose no danger of
corruption or its appearance.81 But in Caperton Justice Kennedy blurred this crucial campaign
finance law distinction. He repeatedly referred to all of Blankenship’s campaign spending as
“contributions,”82

although only the $1,000 Blankenship gave to the Benjamin campaign

committee was a “contribution within the meaning of campaign finance doctrine.” Virtually all
of the $3 million Blankenship spent to promote Benjamin or attack McGraw consisted of
independent expenditures, which are constitutionally immune from limitation because the Court

78
79

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976).
Id. at 19-20.

80 Id. at 26–29 (1976).
81 Id. at 45–48, 53, 55–56; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357–60.
82 Caperton, 558 U.S. at 872–73, 884–86.
21

has determined that they cannot be a cause of corruption, or the appearance of corruption.83
Justice Kennedy, who has authored multiple opinions in campaign finance cases,84 surely knew
the difference between contributions and expenditures.

Perhaps because Caperton did not

implicate limitations on campaign money but only the consequences for a judge who benefited
from so much of it, the First Amendment did not come into play and so the distinction did not
matter. The association of “contributions” with “corruption” in campaign finance doctrine,
however, may have given the majority opinion some additional rhetorical heft, even if, from a
campaign finance law perspective, the use of the term “contribution” was misleading.
Caperton is a due process case. Its focus is on the post-election behavior of judges, not
on anything a judicial candidate may say or spend – or may not say or spend --in her election
campaign, or on anything the candidate’s supporters could say or spend. As Justice Kennedy
stressed in Citizens United, “Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be
recused, not that the litigant's political speech could be banned.”85 To be sure, the “rule” that
emerges from Caperton is quite uncertain. The Court repeatedly emphasizes the “extreme” facts
and “extraordinary” circumstances driving its holding. By my count Justice Kennedy uses
“extraordinary” four times86 and “extreme” eight times87 to describe Blankenship’s spending and
83 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45–48.
84 See, e.g., Citizens United, supra (opinion for the Court); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 286–350
(concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC,
500 U.S. 377, 405–10 (2000) (dissenting); Colorado Rep. Fed. Elec. Camp. Comm. v. FEC, 518
U.S. 604, 626–31 (1996) (concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
85 558 U.S. at 360.
86 See 558 U.S. at 872, 882, 886, 887.
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its asserted impact on the election, on tandem with the pendency of the Massey case before
Benjamin’s court. Justice Kennedy’s premise that Blankenship’s spending “had a significant and
disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome”88 is debatable. Benjamin won by more than
six percent of the vote;89 he was endorsed by nearly every major newspaper in the state; 90 and
McGraw injured his chances

by a highly intemperate Labor Day speech in Racine, West

Virginia, that became known as the “Scream from Racine” and was prominently featured in
campaign ads against him.91 Moreover, as Chief Justice Roberts demonstrated by the forty
questions he asked in his dissent,92 it is not at all clear from Caperton how much spending or
from what sources would trigger due process concern, or whether recusal would also be required
if the litigant who spent heavily in an election had a case before the benefited judge that
implicated a broad social, ideological or policy issue, rather than the narrow economic interest of
a specific firm like that at issue in Caperton.93 Nor is it clear whether, if he had been reelected,

87 Id. at 886, 887 (five times), 888 (twice).
88 Id. at 885. Justice Kennedy’s opinion uses the phrase “significant and disproportionate” to
characterize Blankenship’s impact on the election four times. See id. at 884-86.
89 Id. at 901 (dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts).
90 Id. at 902.
91 Dickerson, Chris, "McGraw suit 'must be' referring to Racine speech". West Virginia Record,
(May 12, 2006), http://wvrecord.com/stories/510590311-mcgraw-suit-must-be-referring-toracine-speech. Chief Justice Roberts referred obliquely to this speech in his dissent. 558 U.S. at
902.
92 558 U.S. at 893–98.
93 Id. at 894–95.
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Justice McGraw would have had to recuse because of a presumptive campaign-spending-based
bias against Massey.94

It is also uncertain whether the due process concern is limited to

campaign spending or could also reach “a debt of gratitude for endorsements by newspapers,
interest groups, politicians, or celebrities.”95
Although Chief Justice Roberts viewed with alarm “the inherently boundless nature” of
Caperton’s “rule”96 and predicted that the courts would soon be “forced to deal with a wide
variety of Caperton motions,”97 it appears that the few such motions have followed 98 and the
case has had little direct impact on the recusal of elected judges.99 More surprisingly, perhaps,
although the Caperton majority avoided any mention of the First Amendment, the case has had
an impact on First Amendment challenges to the canons governing judicial campaign behavior.
In cases in which state judges or judicial candidates claimed that state canons restricting their
partisan political activities (such as endorsing a candidate for non-judicial office or holding a

94 Id. at 895 (question 18).
95 Id. (question 20). For another very critical assessment of Caperton, see Ronald D. Rotunda,
Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 41-57 (2011).
96 558 U.S. at 899.
97 Id. at 900.
98 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, et al, Caperton and the Courts: Did the Floodgates Open? 18 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL. 481, 494 (Professor Bradley Smith finds “it has indeed been rare to have
Caperton motions.”)
99 Caperton may have served as the impetus for some states to revise their recusal rules. See id.
at 486–87 (comments of Professor Keith Swisher).
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leadership position in a partisan political organization) are unconstitutional, federal courts of
appeals have invoked Caperton for the proposition that states “have a compelling interest in
developing, and indeed are required by the Fourteenth Amendment to develop” an independent
and fair judiciary.100 Their decisions have also noted that public confidence in the judiciary—
which “depends on its reputation for impartiality”—is promoted by “rules that keep judges out of
active politics.”101 Indeed, in the hands of some courts, Caperton has taken on new life by
providing authority for the determination that the “appearance of impartiality” is a compelling
justification for restrictions on the political activities of judges,102 even though that concern had
gotten short shrift in White. The Eighth Circuit decision in Wersal v. Sexton,103 citing Caperton
as establishing that the appearance of judicial impartiality is a compelling state interest, is
particularly striking as that court also invoked Caperton to reject the idea that recusal would be a
less restrictive, and, thus, constitutionally required, alternative to a speech limitation.104 The
court found “Caperton illustrative of the unworkability of recusal” in certain circumstances.105
“[R]ecusal serves as an after-the-fact remedy that is insufficient to cure the damage to the
appearance of impartiality.”106

100 Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 2010).
101 Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2010).
102 Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1022 (8th Cir. 2012).
103 674 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2012).
104 Id. at 1027–31.
105 Id. at 1031.
106 Id.
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Caperton has, thus, become a medium for smuggling Justice Ginsburg’s focus on due
process concerns into the First Amendment analysis of restrictions on judicial campaign conduct.
To be sure, the impartiality threatened in Caperton was precisely the one kind of impartiality
Justice Scalia in White had been willing to accept as a compelling state interest—impartiality
with respect to the specific parties in a specific case. Caperton did not implicate the other
arguable impartiality concerns of preconceptions with respect to legal issues or lack of openmindedness. But the lower courts citing Caperton opened up its potential significance by
framing the issue as not about the bias vel non of the judge with respect to the parties to a case,
but rather about the crucial importance of the appearance of judicial impartiality, that is, the
public’s belief that its judiciary is impartial.
The post-Caperton appeals court cases that factored Caperton’s due process focus into a
compelling interest in the appearance of judicial impartiality tended to involve restrictions on
political activity in support of political parties or other candidates and not the judicial candidate’s
own campaign. But in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, the Supreme Court extended the due
process concern into a First Amendment analysis of a restriction of a judicial candidate’s own
campaign behavior.
C. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar
In Williams-Yulee, the Supreme Court, in yet another 5-4 split, rejected a First
Amendment challenge to the canon in the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Florida
Supreme Court that prohibits judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign
funds. The Court held, as White had assumed,107 that restrictions on judicial campaign speech

107 White, 536 U.S. at 774.
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are subject to strict judicial scrutiny,108 thereby requiring that a restriction on the solicitation of
campaign contributions be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest in order to survive a
constitutional challenge.109 Then the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, did a
“rare”110 thing and held that Florida had demonstrated that its speech restriction was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.111 In so doing, the Court’s application of strict
scrutiny was considerably less strict than the analysis undertaken in White thirteen years earlier.

108 Williams-Yulee, 135 S.Ct. at 1665.
109 Id. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court commanded only four votes for these
points. See id. at 1662, 1664–65. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, who joined in the judgment
sustaining the personal solicitation ban and in the rest of the Court’s analysis, would not have
applied strict scrutiny. See id. at 1673–75. However, the four justices who dissented from the
Court’s holding – Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito – agreed with the plurality that
strict scrutiny applied. Id. at 1676 (Dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas); id. at 1685 (dissenting opinion of Justice Kennedy); id. at 1685–86 (dissenting opinion
of Justice Alito).
110 Id. at 1665–66.
111 Williams-Yulee is only the third time that the Court has found that a measure challenged as a
violation of the First Amendment’s protection of speech survived strict scrutiny and only the
second election regulation to so survive. See, e.g., Noah B. Lindell, Williams-Yulee and the
Anomaly of Campaign Finance Law, 126 YALE L.J. 1577, 1577 (2017). The other election law
case was Burson v. Freeman, which upheld a ban on electioneering at polling places. 504 U.S.
191 (1992). The non-election case was Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. 561 U.S. 1, 25–39
(2010).
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First, Chief Justice Roberts quickly found “preserving public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary” to be a compelling state interest.112 Indeed, he twice cited Caperton—for which
he had written the lead dissent—to make that point.113 Unlike Justice Scalia in White, Chief
Justice Roberts made little effort to define “integrity” or its relationship to the other judicial
virtues the Chief Justice deemed essential --“impartiality” or “independence”114 Nor did he
make much of an effort to assess what makes for public confidence in the judiciary—the actual
compelling interest—which he acknowledged is “intangible.”115 Rather, he seemed comfortable
with the fact that “[t]he concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not easily reduce
to precise definition, nor does it lend itself to proof by documentary record.”116
Second, he immediately determined that the ban on personal solicitation served the
interests in judicial integrity and the appearance thereof, again without the kind of evidence
Justice Scalia had demanded in White. Instead the link between the restriction and the interests
served was “intuitive,”117 and like the judicial integrity interest itself needed no empirical proof.
Third, the Court rejected claims that the canon failed strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring
requirement.
underinclusive.

Indeed, the personal solicitation ban was arguably both overbroad and
From the overbreadth perspective, the restriction was not limited to the

solicitation of lawyers or litigants, but proscribed the solicitation of anyone. A judicial candidate
112 135 S.Ct. at 1666.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1671.
116 Id. at 1667.
117 Id. at 1666.
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could not solicit even her own mother for funds.

Nor was the ban limited to in-person

solicitations, which could be seen as coercive or leading directly to favoritism to donors, but also
applied to internet postings and mass mailings, where there was no personal contact between
candidate and donor. Moreover, there was an arguably less restrictive way of dealing with
possible favoritism to a donor in a case in which the donor has an interest -- recusal.
The underinclusiveness argument was also strong. The rule provided that the solicitation
of campaign funds for a judicial candidate could be undertaken by a committee established by
the candidate.118 But nothing prevented the candidate from learning which potential donors were
solicited or which ones made donations. Indeed, Florida specifically permits judicial candidates
to write thank you notes to campaign donors.119
However, Chief Justice Roberts waved away both sets of objections. The restriction was
not overly broad. Florida could conclude that there was something especially problematic about
all personal appeals by judges and judicial candidates for campaign money: “Florida has
reasonably determined that personal appeals for money by a judicial candidate inherently create
an appearance of impropriety that may cause the public to lose confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary.”120 Nor was recusal a less restrictive alternative. A recusal requirement “would
disable many jurisdictions”—presumably smaller jurisdictions with one or only a small number
of judges121—and, quoting his Caperton dissent, Chief Justice Roberts expressed the concern
that “a flood of postelection recusal motions” could itself erode public confidence in the

118

Id. at 1663.

119 Id. at 1668.
120 Id. at 1671.
121

See, e.g., Fiut, Recusal and Recompense: Amending New York Recusal Law in Light of the Judicial
Pay Raise Controversy, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1597, 1601 (2009).
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judiciary.122 The canon was also determined to be not underinclusive. The Court emphasized
that Florida could treat personal solicitation as “the conduct most likely to undermine public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary”123 and as “categorically different and [a] more severe
risk of undermining public confidence”124 than solicitation by a committee even though the
candidate is aware of the committee’s work and potential donors know of the candidate’s
awareness. Personal solicitation “creates pressure for the recipient to comply, and it does so in a
way that solicitation by a third party does not.”125
Justice Alito’s sarcastic dissent snarled that the Florida rule “is about as narrowly tailored
as a burlap bag. . . . If this rule can be characterized as narrowly tailored, then narrow tailoring
has no meaning . . . .”126 Without getting into the merits of Justice Alito’s critique127 it is clear
122 Id. at 1671–72.
123 Id. at 1668
124 Id. at 1669.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1685.
127 For more critical appraisals of the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to the Florida
personal solicitation ban, see, e.g., Clay Hansen, J. Joshua Wheeler, Free Speech, Elections, and
Judicial Integrity in an Age of Exceptionalism, 31 J. L.& POL. 457 (2016), Michael Linton
Wright, Comment, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar: Judicial Elections, Impartiality and the
Threat to Free Speech, 93 DENV. L. REV. 551, 569–72 (2016); Lijun Zhang, Paved with Good
Intentions: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 29 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1483 (2016). Also noteworthy is leading First Amendment advocate Floyd
Abrams’s comment that the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis “is enough to make First Amendment
30

that Chief Justice Roberts adopted a much looser approach to narrow tailoring than Justice Scalia
had in White. Indeed, the Chief Justice was relatively candid about that. In rebutting the
underinclusiveness claim, he asserted a “State need not address all aspects of a problem in one
fell swoop.”128 In defending against the overbreadth argument he explained that narrow tailoring
does not mean “perfect tailoring.”129
Running through the Court’s opinion and undergirding its deferential approach to the
Florida canon was Chief Justice Roberts’ insistence that judicial elections are different from
what he called “political elections.” Justice Roberts urged that “[j]udges are not politicians, even
when they come to the bench by way of the ballot. And a State’s decision to elect its judiciary
does not compel it to treat judicial candidates like campaigners for political office.”130 As Justice
Kennedy had done in distinguishing Citizens United in Caperton, Chief Justice Roberts
emphasized that unlike other elected officials, an elected judge “is not to follow the preferences
of his supporters, or provide any special consideration to his campaign donors.” 131 As a result,
state regulation of judicial elections can go beyond the prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption, which are the sole bases for campaign finance restrictions in “political
aficionados wish that the Court had never decided that strict scrutiny applied at all.” Floyd
Abrams, Symposium: When strict scrutiny ceased to be strict,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/symposium-when-strict-scrutiny-ceased-to-be-strict/,

2015.
128 Id. at 1669.
129 Id. at 1671 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 (1992)).
130 Id. at 1662.
131 Id. at 1667.
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April 30,

elections,”

and may aim more broadly to protect public confidence in judicial integrity. The

Chief Justice went so far as to claim that White provided support for the position that “our
precedents applying the First Amendment to political elections have little bearing on the issues
here,” although his main citation for that was Justice Ginsburg’s White dissent.132 But whether
or not the Court properly read White—which seemed far more intent on requiring that the
constitutional doctrines applicable to elections generally and election speech in particular
presumptively apply to judicial elections—Williams-Yulee clearly sets a tone of openness to
treating judicial elections differently.
As with White, the main significance of Williams-Yulee may be its analytical stance
rather than its holding. To be sure, unlike the announce clause invalidated in White, bans on
personal solicitation of campaign funds are widespread, with similar restrictions in place in thirty
of the thirty-nine states that elect judges.133

Moreover, before the Court’s decision the

constitutional status of those bans was quite uncertain. One article published after oral argument
but before the Court’s decision found that two federal courts of appeals and three state supreme
courts (including Florida’s) had rejected constitutional challenges to the bans, while four other
federal courts of appeals had held the bans were unconstitutional.134 If the decision had gone the
132 Id. (citing White, 536 U.S at 783, 805). The second citation is to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.
The first is to the language in the majority opinion stating “we neither assert nor imply that the
First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative
office” – not exactly a ringing declaration that judicial elections may be regulated differently.
133 135 S.Ct. at 1663.
134 See Steele Trotter, Williams-Yulee and the Changing Landscape of Judicial Campaigns, 28
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 947, 948 & n.9 (2015) (citing cases).
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other way it would have affected the law governing judicial campaigns in many states. On the
other hand, given the universal availability of the campaign committee option and the lack of
limits on what a judicial candidate can know about the donors to her committee, it is doubtful
whether the case will have much practical impact on judicial campaign fundraising. However,
the case does appear to invite more deferential judicial review of state restrictions on judicial
campaign activities and has been used by lower courts to sustain various restrictions on judicial
candidates.
Relying on Williams-Yulee’s compelling interest and narrow tailoring analyses, the Ninth
Circuit in Wolfson v. Concannon135 rejected a constitutional challenge to the provisions of the
Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct barring judges and judicial candidates from soliciting funds
for other candidates or political organizations, from publicly endorsing candidates for other
public offices, from making speeches on behalf of other candidates or political organizations, or
from taking an active part in any political campaign. The state’s interest in public confidence in
the judiciary was found sufficient to support all the restrictions and, within the spirit of WilliamsYulee, they were all held to be narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means of attaining the
state’s goals.136
The Sixth Circuit has also repeatedly drawn on Williams-Yulee to sustain restrictions on
judicial political activity against First Amendment attack. In Winter v. Wolnitzek,137 the court
upheld the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct’s bans on a judicial candidate making a

135 Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016).
136 Id. at 1181–86.
137 Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2016).
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contribution to a political organization or candidate;138 endorsing or opposing a candidate for
public office;139 acting as a leader or holding any office in a political organization;140 and
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth making false statements on matters material to
a campaign during a campaign.141 With respect to the last provision, the court acknowledged
that a different Sixth Circuit panel had just invalidated an Ohio law banning false statements that
applied to non-judicial candidates. Citing Williams-Yulee, the Winter panel reasoned that the
different treatment of the judicial candidate false statement ban was justified because Kentucky’s
interest “in preserving public confidence in the honesty and integrity of its judiciary is . . . more
compelling than Ohio’s purported interest in protecting voters in other elected races from
misinformation.”142
A Montana federal district court similarly invoked Williams-Yulee to rebuff a judicial
candidate’s challenge to a Montana canon prohibiting false statements by or about judicial
candidates.143 The court found that the state’s compelling interest in preserving and promoting

138 Id. 690–91 (6th Cir. 2016).
139 Id. at 691–92.
140 Id. at 692–93
141 Id. at 693.
142 Id. The Ohio law also swept more broadly than the Kentucky measure, applying to all false
statements, whereas the Kentucky law applied only to false statements of material facts, and the
Ohio law imposed liability on publishers, not just speakers. Id.
143 Myers v. Thompson, 192 F.Supp.3d 1129 (D. Mont. 2016).
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public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary supported a ban on candidate false statements
and that the restriction was neither overbroad nor underinclusive.144
A second Sixth Circuit panel relied on Williams-Yulee’s compelling interest in
“maintaining public perception of judicial integrity and impartiality” in sustaining Ohio’s
prohibition on listing judicial candidate party affiliations on the general election ballot. 145 The
court also invoked Williams-Yulee’s rather loose approach to narrow tailoring in finding that this
limited minimization of partisanship in judicial elections146 was not fatally underinclusive.147 A
third Sixth Circuit decision, O’Toole v. O’Connor,148 relied on Williams-Yulee’s compelling
interest and narrow tailoring analyses to sustain against First Amendment attack a provision of
the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct limiting the time period in which a judicial candidate’s
campaign committee may solicit and receive campaign contributions. 149 That panel also rejected
an argument that the application of a fundraising time limit only to judicial campaigns and not to
other political organizations violated the Equal Protection Clause, citing Williams-Yulee’s

144 Id. at 1139–41.
145 Ohio Council 8 AFSCME v. Husted, 814 F.3d 329, 338 (6th Cir. 2016).
146 Judicial candidates must first compete in partisan primaries; the candidates may identify
with their political parties during their campaigns; and the parties may campaign for and
advertise on behalf of their candidates. Id. at 332-33.
147 Id. at 340.
148 O’Toole v. O’Connor, 802 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2015).
149 Id. at 789–91.
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“enunciation of the distinction between judicial campaigns and non-judicial political
campaigns.”150
To be sure, none of these decisions call into question White’s determination that judicial
candidates are free to announce their views on disputed legal questions. The Ninth Circuit in
Wolfson made that point in confirming that a judicial candidate has the right to speak concerning
her own campaign.

The Arizona canons at issue limited only the candidate’s freedom to

participate in other candidates’ campaigns.151 The Sixth Circuit in Winter made the point even
more strongly in invalidating Kentucky’s ban on a judicial candidate “campaigning as a member
of a political organization,” such as a political party, and on making speeches for a political
organization, which the court read as barring the candidate from declaring that he or she is “for
the Republican Party.”152 Both provisions were seen as unconstitutionally interfering with the
candidate’s White-protected ability to “tak[e] a stance on ‘matters of current public
importance.’”153 As Judge Sutton put it at the conclusion of his Winter opinion , although
“treating elections for the courts just like elections for the political branches does not make
sense,” a state that elects its judges also “has no right to suspend the First Amendment in the
process.”154
D. A Court Divided

150 Id. at 792.
151 811 F.3d at 1185.
152 834 F.3d at 689.
153 Id. at 688.
154 Id. at 695.
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Over the last two decades the Supreme Court has heard three cases dealing with speech
and campaign finance in judicial elections, and each time the Court divided 5-4. The Court’s
“conservatives” have generally opposed restrictions on judicial candidates. Justices Scalia and
Thomas voted against the restrictions in all three cases. Chief Justice Rehnquist did so in the one
case he heard (White) and Justice Alito did so in the two cases he heard (Caperton and WilliamsYulee).

The Court’s “liberals” have generally supported regulation of judicial campaigns.

Justices Ginsburg and Breyer voted for regulation in all three cases. Justices Stevens and Souter
did so in the two cases they heard (White and Caperton), and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan did
so in the one case they heard (Williams-Yulee). This divide tends to map the Court’s 5-4 division
in campaign finance cases generally—with two anomalies.155 Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Roberts have both been vigorous critics of campaign finance regulation and both have
155 Another arguable anomaly is Justice O’Connor, who frequently voted to reject challenges to
campaign finance laws but voted with the anti-regulatory majority in White. Justice O’Connor
was deeply troubled by judicial elections generally, expressing her concern that “the very
practice of electing judges” undermines the compelling interest in an impartial judiciary. 536
U.S. at 788. However, she appeared to conclude that having “chosen to select its judges through
contested popular elections,” id. at 792, the First Amendment rules ordinarily applicable to
contested elections would apply. According to Professor Geyh, after she retired, Justice
O’Connor “second-guessed her own conclusions and embarked on a campaign to ameliorate
what she regarded as the deleterious effects of judicial elections.” Charles Gardner Geyh, The
Jekyll and Hyde of First Amendment Limits on the Regulation of Judicial Campaign Speech, 68
VAND. L. REV. En Banc 83, 92 (2015). In any event, White was not a campaign finance case so
it is not clear that her White vote is in tension with her other votes concerning election regulation.
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consistently been part of the Court’s 5-4 majority that has repeatedly cut back on or invalidated
campaign finance laws since the mid-2000’s. Yet in the judicial campaign setting each cast the
dispositive vote once, and wrote the majority opinion for, the regulatory side. However, each
also sharply disagreed with the other in the two cases on which they both sat (Caperton,
Williams-Yulee).156
Of the two, the bigger anomaly is surely Chief Justice Roberts and his vote in WilliamsYulee. As previously noted, Justice Kennedy’s Caperton opinion avoided any mention of the
First Amendment and, as he subsequently stressed in Citizens United, his Caperton opinion
provided no basis for limiting judicial campaign speech or spending. In his view, judges may
have a higher duty to avoid the appearance of partiality than do other elected officials, but
judicial elections are to be run by the same rules as other elections. This theme is also central to
his separate opinions in both White and Williams-Yulee.
By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts grounded his Williams-Yulee analysis in the First
Amendment and confirmed that strict scrutiny applies to restrictions on judicial candidate
speech. Yet he strongly asserted that not only are judges different from other elected officials,
but the special status of judges allows states to treat judicial elections to differently and to
subject them to more speech-restrictive rules.157 Given Williams-Yulee, it is a little hard to
understand the vehemence of his Caperton dissent. Perhaps it was the lack of a clear-cut “rule”
in the Court’s “totality of the circumstances” opinion. Perhaps it was the concern that by
inviting constitutionally-grounded recusal motions Caperton would ultimately undermine public
156 Justice Kennedy also sat on White case and voted with the anti-regulatory majority in that
case.
157 135 S.Ct. at 1667, 1672.
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confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, which, as his Williams-Yulee opinion indicates, is for
him a consideration of the highest order.

Yet, his Caperton dissent notwithstanding, his

Williams-Yulee opinion clearly reflects the integration of Caperton’s due process concern into
the First Amendment analysis.
Moreover, although the issue in Williams-Yulee was a narrow one, the Chief Justice’s
opinion is potentially quite open-ended, arguably more so than Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Caperton. In Caperton, the Court tracked White in focusing on the compelling interest in
avoiding judicial bias for or against a party in a specific case. Caperton extended the grounds of
what could constitute bias, but its sole focus was on party-specific bias. Williams-Yulee, instead,
focused on the broader and more intangible concepts of judicial integrity and the public
perception of it, It sustained a restriction not tied to preventing bias for or against a specific
litigant but aimed instead at promoting the legitimacy of the judiciary generally. Coupled with
its loosened approach to the narrow tailoring requirement, Williams-Yulee’s more capacious
definition of compelling interest may enable many more restrictions to pass constitutional muster
than would have been the case if White were still the lead First Amendment precedent. That is
certainly how it has been used in the handful of federal court decisions that have applied the case
over the past two years.158
158 See, e.g., Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d at 692–93 (relying on Williams-Yulee in sustaining
provisions banning judicial candidate endorsements and acting as the leader of a political
organization, and penalizing false statements by judicial candidates); O’Toole v. O’Connor, 802
F.3d at 78992 (relying on Williams-Yulee in sustaining provision limiting time period for
solicitation and receipt of campaign contributions); Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d at 1181–86
(relying on Williams-Yulee in sustaining provisions concerning personal solicitation,
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Of course, none of these cases support any limits on judicial campaign speech, other than
the very specific speech of a candidate expressly asking for a contribution, or any limits on
spending by either the candidate or independent groups.
IV. REGULATING DARK MONEY IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
A. What is Dark Money, and What Makes It Dark?
The term “dark money” refers to election campaign expenditures by independent groups
that do not disclose the sources of the funds used to pay for those expenditures.159 Some of the
expenditures, particularly broadcast advertising that focuses on a candidate, are commonly
subject to reporting requirements, and the name and address of the entity that formally pays for
the expenditure is typically subject to disclosure. But the identities of the donors, and the
amounts given by individual donors, are not disclosed.
How can this occur even when the jurisdiction has laws requiring the disclosure of the
identities of, and sums given by, campaign donors? There are two reasons. First, most donor
disclosure laws focus on “political committees,” which consist of candidate campaign
committees, political party committees, and other committees that cross some threshold of

endorsements, and campaigning for other candidates); Myers v. Thompson, 192 F.Supp.3d at
1138–42 (relying on Williams-Yulee in sustaining provision barring false statements about
judicial candidates); Ohio Council 8 AFSCME v. Husted, 814 F.3d 329, 340 (6th Cir. 2016)
(relying on Williams-Yulee in sustaining Ohio law barring indication of a judicial candidate’s
party affiliation on the general election ballot).
159 See, e.g., Center for Responsive Politics, Dark Money Basics,
http://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/basics.
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engagement in electioneering.160 Some committees engage in both electioneering concerning
candidates and political activity that addresses issues more broadly. Committees that engage in
independent spending (i.e. spending that is not coordinated with a candidate) will be subject to
donor disclosure requirements only if their electioneering spending concerning candidates
crosses a certain dollar threshold or a certain fraction of their overall spending. 161 Second, some
laws require the disclosure of the donors financing electioneering expenditures above a certain
threshold amount even if the organization paying for the expenditure is not a political
committee.162 The Supreme Court, however, has narrowed the definition of electioneering for
160 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4) (defining “political committee” for purposes of federal
campaign finance law), §§ 30102, 30103, 30104 (tying organizational, registration, and reporting
requirements to political committee status).
161 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 79 (committee, other than a candidate’s committee
or political party committee, will be subject to federal campaign finance reporting requirements
if its “major purpose” is the nomination or election of a candidate); Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d
1182 (9th Cir. 2015) (sustaining Hawaii law applying reporting and disclosure requirements to
committees that raise or spend more than $1,000 for electoral purposes in an election cycle);
Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011) (sustaining Maine law applying
political committee status and reporting requirements to committees that raise or spend more
than $5000 for election purposes in an election cycle);
162 See, e.g., Delaware Strong Families v. Attorney General, 793 F.3d 304 (3d. Cir. 2015)
(sustaining application of Delaware law requiring disclosures by organization that spend over a
threshold amount on electioneering communications), cert. den. sub nom. Delaware Strong
Families v. Dent, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).
41

the purposes of campaign finance regulation.

The Court’s definition includes only

communications that expressly advocate for or against the election of a clearly identified
candidate, and broadcast communications in the immediate pre-election period that clearly name
a candidate even if they do not engage in express advocacy.163 Communications that sharply
criticize a candidate, but avoid the “magic words” of express advocacy outside the immediate
pre-election period, are not considered to be electioneering.164 Thus, any donations specifically
funding such communications do not have to be disclosed. Moreover, such expenditures are not
counted in determining whether the organization’s expenditures cross the threshold that triggers
treating the organization as a political committee.
B. How May Dark Money Be Regulated in Non-Judicial Elections?
Starting with Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the
informational benefits of donor disclosure in enabling voters to evaluate candidates.

By

informing voters about the sources of a candidate’s funds, disclosure “alert[s] the voter to the
interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate[s] predictions of
future performance in office.”165 The voter information value of donor disclosure is even more
important for independent committees that typically operate under meaningless names like
163 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 43-44 & n. 52. See generally Richard Briffault, Issue
Advocacy” Redrawing the Elections/Politics Divide, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1751 (1999).
164 Id. In McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), the Supreme Court sustained Congress’s
determination in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that for purposes of the definition
of “electioneering communications” broader than express advocacy the immediate pre-election
period is thirty days before a primary and sixty days before a general election.
165 424 U.S. at 67.
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“Americans for Prosperity” or “American Action Network,” which tell the voters nothing about
what the committee stands for or may be downright misleading.166
The Court reiterated its commitment to donor disclosure by independent committees in
Citizens United. Although Citizens United’s spending could not be limited, it could be required
to disclose the identities of the donors who paid for its television broadcasts that mentioned
candidate Hillary Clinton in the pre-election period even though its ads did not include express
advocacy. The Court declared that “the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about
a candidate shortly before an election.”167 Moreover, although the Court in Buckley construed
the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (“FECA”) definition of “political committee” to apply only
to organizations with the “major purpose”168 of supporting or opposing candidates in federal
elections,169 it is not clear whether the “major purpose” standard is constitutionally required for
state disclosure laws. In McConnell v. FEC, the Court held that Buckley’s definition of electionrelated spending for purposes of FECA’s disclosure requirement as “express advocacy” was a
matter of “statutory interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law,170 so that Congress
could go further and subject “electioneering communications”—defined as broadcast ads that
166 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending,
27 J. L. & POL. 683, 691–92 (2012).
167 558 U.S. at 369.
168 The Supreme Court has never defined “major purpose,” but in federal cases it has been treated as requiring
that a majority of an organization’s fundraising or spending be for federal election purposes. See, e.g. Citizens for
Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 209 F.Supp.3d 77 (D.D.C. 2016) (considering the question of the
applicable time frame for determining an organization’s major purpose).

169 424 U.S. at 79.
170 540 U.S. 93, 190 (2003).
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refer to a candidate in a defined pre-election period—to disclosure. Several federal appeals
courts have upheld state laws setting a much lower threshold than “major purpose” for imposing
disclosure requirements on independent spenders.171 There is also a good argument that for
disclosure purposes the broader definition of “electioneering communication” endorsed by the
Court in McConnell could be extended beyond the broadcast media covered by the federal statute
before the Court in McConnell to include other media, such as print, direct mail, and telephone
banks.172 Although few jurisdictions have adopted them, Citizens United signals that relatively
broad campaign finance disclosure laws are likely to pass constitutional muster.173
171 See, e.g., Yamada v. Snipes, supra; Center for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464
(7th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, supra; Human Life of Washington, Inc. v.
Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). But see N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d
247 (4th Cir. 2008). See generally Briffault, Updating Disclosure, supra, 27 J. L. & Pol. at 69295.
172 See id. at 699–707.
173 See also John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010). Disclosure is one area where the
death of Justice Scalia and his replacement by Justice Gorsuch could affect the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. Although strongly hostile to most campaign finance regulation, Justice Scalia was
a strong proponent of disclosure, famously remarking that disclosure “is a price our people have
traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance. Requiring people to stand up in public for
their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.” See id. at 228
(concurring in the judgment). It is unclear where Justice Gorsuch stands on disclosure.
However, Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts have also supported disclosure laws, so,
joined by the Court’s “liberals” there is probably still a majority for disclosure. Cf.
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On the other hand, there is at present zero prospect of limiting “dark money” or any other
independent spending in executive or legislative elections. With the sole exception of one
decision sustaining limits on corporate and union independent spending174—which was
overturned in Citizens United175—the Court has consistently invalidated limits on independent
spending.

Thus, Citizens United firmly establishes the unconstitutionality of limits on

independent spending for the foreseeable future. Dark money can be made less dark, but it
cannot be limited.
C. Can Dark Money Be More Regulated in Judicial Elections?
There are three possible types of regulation of dark money in judicial elections:
disclosure, limits, and recusal.
(1) Disclosure
As I just suggested, there is a strong doctrinal basis for requiring significant donor
disclosure by dark money groups in all elections. Lower courts have indicated that electioneering
need not be the dominant purpose of a group in order to trigger a disclosure requirement. The
Supreme Court has made clear that disclosure need not be limited to donors to ads engaged in
express advocacy. To be sure, not many jurisdictions have gone to the constitutional limit for
disclosure in elections generally. Arguments about the special nature of judicial elections would
Independence Inst. v. FEC, 137 S.Ct. 1204 (Feb. 27, 2017), aff’g mem. Independence Inst. v.
FEC, 216 F.Supp.3d 176 (D.D.C. 2016) (three-judge court rejects claim by non-profit
organization that its advertising constituted issue advocacy exempt from disclosure though it
referred to specific candidates).
174 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 662 (1990).
175 558 U.S. at 365.
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not be needed to support effective disclosure of dark money donors in judicial contests, although
they might be politically helpful.
A related question is whether it would be constitutionally permissible to have enhanced
disclosure for independent committees that spend only on judicial elections, and not for
independent committees participating in other elections. The Sixth Circuit’s rejection in O’Toole
v. O’Connor of an Equal Protection argument challenging more restrictive regulation of judicial
elections suggests that such a targeted disclosure requirement could be constitutionally viable.
This is significant given the generally lower availability of voter information concerning
candidates in judicial elections compared to other races. On the other hand, such an enhanced
disclosure requirement would have to be implemented by statute. Most of the special restrictions
on judicial campaign conduct are found in the canons of judicial conduct that are adopted by
state supreme courts, but the courts can regulate only by court rule and only with respect to
judges, judicial candidates, and possibly lawyers. They cannot regulate other campaign actors,
such as political parties and independent committees.
(2) Limits
Limits on spending in elections generally are flatly unconstitutional.

Can judicial

elections be a special case? Can the compelling interest in judicial integrity and the appearance
of judicial integrity support such limits? Probably not.176 In the Supreme Court’s vision,
campaign expenditures benefit from strong First Amendment protection because they
communicate arguments, ideas, and information to the voters.

According to the Court,

176 See, e.g., Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998) (invalidating judicial candidate
spending limit adopted by Ohio Supreme Court as amendment to the Ohio Code of Judicial
Conduct).
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independent spending that is, spending undertaken by organizations without prearrangement or
coordination with a candidate, poses no danger of corruption or the appearance of corruption,
which the Court has said is the only justification for limiting campaign money. 177

Is the

spending on campaign communications by independent groups in judicial races less
constitutionally protected than in other elections? Surely not.
Independent spending in judicial elections is as much about the communication of views
on matters of public importance as is independent spending in all other elections.

White

confirms this, and even Williams-Yulee emphasized that the canon it upheld restricted only “a
narrow slice of speech”178 and asserted that “[j]udicial candidates have a First Amendment right
to speak in support of their campaigns.”179 The post-Williams-Yulee lower court cases that
sustained restrictions on judicial political activities consistently confirmed the broad First
Amendment protections that judicial candidates enjoy when campaigning for themselves.180 It
seems highly unlikely that the compelling interest in judicial integrity would support limits on
spending by judicial candidates. After all, a candidate’s own campaigning does not undermine
his or her impartiality—assuming as White does that the articulation of legal or political views is
not inconsistent with judicial impartiality—or independence.
It is even harder to see how the judicial integrity interest can support limits on spending
by independent organizations that will never decide cases or sit on the bench. The due process
177 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45–47; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359–61.
178 135 S.Ct. at 1670.
179 Id. at 1673.
180 See, e.g., Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d at 1185; Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d at 688–
90.
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concern for judicial integrity that Williams-Yulee relied on is unlikely to provide support for
limitations on the core First Amendment-protected speech of non-judges.181

To be sure,

spending by independent organizations can generate a “debt of gratitude” in judicial candidates
and result in the danger of bias in favor of the spender in post-election litigation. However, as
Caperton held, the remedy for this is recusal, not limitations on spending.
(3) Recusal:
Caperton clearly mandates recusal due to significant independent spending in some cases
and confirms that the states are free to go further “to impose more rigorous standards for judicial
disqualification” than the Constitution requires.182 Caperton, of course, was not a dark money
case. It was the very fact that it was well-known that Don Blankenship was financing the antiMcGraw spending that led to the requirement that Justice Benjamin recuse. In theory, disclosure
actually generates the need for recusal as there can be no danger of bias for a financial supporter
if the judge does not know the identity of that supporter.

However, even without public

disclosure of the identities of the funders of dark money spending, candidates are likely to know
who their backers are even if the voting public doesn’t. Thus, there is a case for recusal even
without disclosure – although without disclosure it will be difficult for the litigant seeking

181 And of course there is no way that state codes of judicial conduct could regulate the
activities of non-judges, non-judicial-candidates, and non-lawyers.
182 566 U.S. at 889–90 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)). See
also White, 536 U.S. at 794 (a state “may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process
requires, and censure judges who violate these standards”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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recusal to prove that the asserted financial supporter really was one. So, an effective recusal
requirement is contingent on effective dark money disclosure.183
Recusal presents many difficulties, not the least of which is that in most states the judge
whose recusal is sought decides the recusal motion.184 There is also the problem alluded to by
Chief Justice Roberts in Williams-Yulee that in some settings it may be difficult to find a judge to
take the recusant’s place.185 The most significant obstacle to recusal as a response to the specific
problem of dark money spending is that many independent committees are not de facto
surrogates for a specific individual or organization that has a stake in a specific case, as And for
the Sake of the Kids appears to have been for Don Blankenship and Massey Coal in Caperton.
Instead, committees are generally advocates for relatively broad economic, social, ideological, or
partisan agendas.186

183 But cf, Stephen J. Ware, Judicial Elections, Judicial Impartiality and Legitimate Judicial
Lawmaking: Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 68 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 59, 79 (2015)
(suggesting but not embracing making judicial campaign contributions anonymous to reduce the
threat to judicial impartiality).
184 See, e.g., Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 NYU J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 631, 652–56
(2015).
185 135 S.Ct. at 1671.
186 See, e.g., Scott Greytak et al, Bankrolling the Bench: The New Politics of Judicial Elections,
2013-14 (Oct. 2015) at 3-4, 9, 13-15, 30-34, 42-47, 59, 76-80 (exploring the large and growing
role of national partisan, economic, and ideological interests in state judicial elections),
http://newpoliticsreport.org/app/uploads/JAS-NPJE-2013-14.pdf.
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To be sure, spending to promote judges who will take a pro-business or antienvironmental regulation approach could financially benefit some of those who have donated to
the spending committee, but that connection is far more attenuated than the one in Caperton.
Would a judge who benefited from spending by a pro-business group have to recuse in a case
challenging a government regulation where the litigant had not contributed to the committee that
had backed the judge? Would it matter if some of those who had contributed to the committee
would benefit from the decision even though they are not parties to the case? And in some
instances of independent spending—by civil rights organizations, traditional moral values
groups, or criminal defense lawyers—the funders may have no financial stake in the litigation
challenging or enforcing a state regulation at all.
As Justice Scalia indicated in White, there is no constitutional difficulty if a judge holds
preexisting views on the legal issues likely to come before her. So, too, voters may choose to
take those views into account when voting on judicial candidates just as in appointive systems
the appointing executive surely takes the views of prospective nominees into account in
determining who to nominate, as do the legislators whose consent may be needed to confirm the
nominee. Although judges are not supposed to be representatives in exactly the same way that
legislators and executives are, they are as Chisom indicated, representatives to some extent, and,
as Gregory held, also policy-makers. Accordingly, not only do independent groups have a
constitutional right to inform the voters and influence them with policy-focused campaigns, but it
is hard to see why an elected judge is improperly biased if he or she participates in cases in
which the policy issues raised by independent committee campaign advertising and arguably
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taken into account by the voters are salient.187 Certainly, there is no greater bias in that case than
if an appointed judge, whose perspective on an issue was likely considered by the appointing
officer, participates in a case in which that issue is central.
A robust recusal requirement triggered by significant independent spending would also
have to decide what to do when a judge, elected in the face of significant hostile independent
spending, is called upon to participate in a case in which those who paid for that spending are
parties. It would be ironic if a committee that failed to defeat a judicial candidate could still use
its spending to knock the judge out of a case in which it has an interest by claiming bias. Yet due
process would be as threatened by the hostile judicial bias of a reelected Justice McGraw as by
Justice Benjamin’s arguable “debt of gratitude” to Don Blankenship.
There is clearly an argument for clarifying and possibly extending Caperton’s recusal
rule to cases in which a party with a significant financial interest in the outcome was also a
significant financial backer of an independent committee that supported the judge hearing the
case. Certainly, it would be useful to clarify many issues, such as how much support—whether
in absolute amounts or as a percent of total spending—should trigger a concern about a “debt of
gratitude”; how long after the election any bias in favor of a financial backer may be presumed to
continue; and what counts as a litigant interest that would trigger concern. The Court has
187 Professor Ware makes a similar point in arguing that while the interest in judicial
impartiality requires that a judge not apply a legal rule specifically to benefit a contributor, as
opposed to other similarly situated parties, it is appropriate for a judge who shares the views of
contributors to exercise a judge’s “legitimate lawmaking discretion” to develop legal rules or
apply them broadly in a manner consistent with those views. See Ware, supra, 68 Vand. L. Rev.
En Banc at 68-78.
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indicated that states may go beyond the minimum due process requires in mandating recusal for
campaign-finance bias, but any recusal requirement would have to address these knotty issues.
Moreover, much as Williams-Yulee indicates that due process can inform the First
Amendment, it may also be the case that the First Amendment may constrain the scope of due
process. The First Amendment has been construed to bar state regulations that discourage
election spending as well as those that prohibit it. In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett,188 the Supreme Court struck down the provision of Arizona’s public
funding law that provided candidates with additional public funds to respond to high levels of
spending by opponents or independent committees.

Although nothing in the law limited

opposition or independent spending, the Court determined that the provision for additional public
funds imposed a “substantial burden” on the spending of those opponents and independent
groups.189 A super-sensitive recusal requirement that forces judges to recuse from the cases most
important to the independent groups that supported their campaigns could be open to a similar
charge that it unconstitutionally burdens campaign speech, which would require a showing that
spending by such a group threatens the fact or appearance of judicial integrity. That would seem
most challenging with respect to the spending of partisan, ideological, or social interest groups
seeking to elect judges who actually share their views rather than groups that hope that judges
will simply be inclined to feel grateful to their financial backers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s judicial campaign jurisprudence reflects the inevitable tug of war
between the idealized vision of judges as impartial decision-makers attentive only to the Law
188 564 U.S. 621 (2011).
189 Id. at 748.
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with a capital “L,” whose legitimacy as decision-makers requires some public belief in their
impartiality, and a pragmatic recognition that judges are also policymakers who come to their
cases with predispositions concerning legal issues that will inevitably affect their judgments.
This tension concerning the appropriate role and political nature of the judge is compounded
when judges are elected. Free elections operate under the assumptions that the voters can make
decisions based on their assessment of how the elected official will perform in office concerning
issues that matter to the voters, that candidates can make their cases to the voters concerning
their performance in office, and that other individuals and groups with an interest in the election
can also seek to inform the voters about the candidates and influence their votes.

These

operating rules for elections surely apply in judicial elections190 but they are also to at least some
extent at odds with the ideals of judicial impartiality and independence. Some attention to the
special nature of the judicial function may lead to some modification of the rules for free
elections, but too many restrictions on campaign communications will undermine the function of
the election itself.
The Supreme Court’s case law demonstrates a point-counterpoint effort to accommodate
these competing concerns. Judicial candidates must be free to communicate their views to the
voters, but certain campaign practices, such as the personal solicitation of campaign funds, may
190 As Professor Burt Neuborne as explained, “American judges, especially appellate judges,
routinely make new law in order to resolve a case or controversy before them. . . . That is why
judicial candidates must be free to express their views on legal issues during the campaign,
allowing the electorate to gain a sense of where the potential judge’s view of the common good
may lie.” Burt Neuborne, What Do Judges Do All Day? 68 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 99, 110
(2015).
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be curtailed if they are seen as posing too great a threat to the appearance of judicial impartiality.
But the scope of the Court’s sense of “too great a threat” is far from resolved.
Judicial campaign spending, including the spending by independent groups, is as
constitutionally protected as spending in other elections; so, too, as in other elections, campaign
spending in judicial races may be subject to disclosure requirements. Under some circumstances
a judge may be required to recuse from a case in which the financial interest of a major campaign
supporter is at stake. But what exactly are the circumstances that trigger a constitutional duty to
recuse? Conversely, how far can a state go in requiring recusal in response to independent
spending before that is seen as unconstitutionally burdening the rights of independent spending?
Both of these questions are far from resolved as well.
The dark money problem is really just an instance of the broader dilemma. On the one
hand, the Court’s standard campaign finance jurisprudence provides adequate support for
bringing dark money to light without regard to the special circumstances of the judiciary. On the
other hand, judicial elections are almost certainly not special enough to exempt them from the
constitutional ban on independent spending. Recusal requirements may in some circumstances
be an appropriate response to dark money spending. But recusal is likely to be least adequate in
dealing with the economic, social, ideological, or partisan spending that accounts for much of the
growth of dark money spending.
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